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MORE MONEY, MORE PROBLEMS: NCAA MODERNIZATION AND
STUDENT ATHLETES’ RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
Sydney Wood†
Abstract
In 2019, California passed a law that would allow collegiate
athletes in California to receive compensation for their name, image,
and likeness. Currently, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
distinguishes between amateur and professional athletes and does not
allow student athletes to receive compensation beyond scholarships.
This Comment analyzes noteworthy case law and summarizes the
arguments of current and former student athletes over the years. The
new California legislation opened the door for substantial change and
challenged the NCAA to finally modernize their bylaws and
regulations. Furthermore, this Comment recommends that the NCAA
adapt the definitions contained in their bylaws to create consistency
and implement a new compensation model that allows student athletes
to financially benefit from their name, image, and likeness while
maintaining their amateur status.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For years, collegiate athletes, postsecondary educational
institutions, and athletic organizations and associations have
addressed the controversial topic of collegiate athlete compensation.
However, in September 2019, California took the first step in creating
substantial change for student athletes. The California law challenges
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA” or the
“Association”) and its current rules regarding amateurism and
compensation. Beginning in January 2023, individuals in California
who compete in intercollegiate athletics will have the right to receive
compensation for their name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) and obtain
professional representation. In response to this legislation, the NCAA
announced that each division will evaluate their current rules and
propose modifications that accommodate student athlete
compensation, while maintaining NCAA amateurism standards. In
addition to drafting new regulations, the NCAA needs to redefine its
terms to allow amateurs to benefit from their skills without direct
compensation for their participation.
The goal of this Comment is to analyze the ongoing issue of
student athlete compensation, evaluate the validity of current
legislation, and ultimately suggest a uniform model for the NCAA and
its member schools to implement. Section II will give a background of
student athlete compensation and some of the factors that continue to
play a role in the controversy. This section will discuss the history of
the NCAA, its rules, and how it currently regulates intercollegiate
athletics. It will also address noteworthy court cases, demonstrating
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how current and former athletes have challenged the validity of the
NCAA rules. A brief discussion of the Sherman Antitrust Act is also
necessary to understand the claims athletes bring against the NCAA.
Section III will outline the new California legislation and explain its
provisions. Then, Section IV will outline recommendations provided
by the NCAA Board of Governors Federal and State Legislation
Working Group Report, consider how the recommendations should be
implemented, and analyze the impact of new regulations on college
athletics as a whole. Lastly, Section V will provide detailed
suggestions for the NCAA as it begins the modernization process,
such as amending their bylaws and implementing a new compensation
model. This Comment proposes a distributed trust fund compensation
model with three essential components: student athletes’ right to
receive payments, scheduled distribution, and regulation and
oversight. The proposed model allows student athletes to receive
compensation from endorsement deals and considers issues that
previous models have not addressed.1
II. BACKGROUND
A. National Collegiate Athletic Association
Regulation of intercollegiate football has been a priority in the
United States for over a century, beginning with the need to monitor
the safety of college athletes.2 The issue became a national concern in
1. Student athlete compensation has been a controversial and highly analyzed
topic with many articles published relating to antitrust laws, NCAA amateurism and
eligibility rules, paying student athletes, student athletes’ right to publicity, etc. See
generally Stanton Wheeler, Rethinking Amateurism and the NCAA, 15 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 213 (2004); Thomas Bright, NCAA Institutes Multi-Year Scholarships,
8 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (2012); Audrey C. Sheetz, Student
Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving Amateurism in College Sports Amidst the Fight for
Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865 (2016); William D. Holthaus, Jr., Ed
O’Bannon v. NCAA: Do Former NCAA Athletes Have a Case Against the NCAA for
its Use of Their Likeness?, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 369 (2010); Victoria Roessler,
College Athletes Rights After O’Bannon: Where do College Athlete Intellectual
Property Rights Go From Here?, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 935 (2016);
Stephanie M. Greene, Regulating the NCAA: Making the Calls Under the Sherman
Antitrust Act and Title IX, 52 ME. L. REV. 81 (2000); Michael S. McLeran, Playing
for Peanuts: Determining Fair Compensation for NCAA Student-Athletes, 65
DRAKE L. REV. 255 (2017).
2. Rodney Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 9, 10 (2000).
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1905 when President Roosevelt invited officials from major football
programs to participate in a White House conference to evaluate
football rules.3 After injuries continued to occur, representatives from
the nation’s major college football programs gathered to evaluate the
possibility of developing valid and effective safety regulations or
consider whether college football should be eliminated altogether.4
These representatives formed the Rules Committee.5 The new Rules
Committee met with participants in the White House conference in an
effort to reform college football rules.6 The combined sixty-two
members ultimately formed the Intercollegiate Athletic Association,
later renamed the NCAA in 1910.7 Originally, the NCAA formulated
safety rules for various collegiate sports.8
In the following years, public interest in college athletics
increased, causing a similar increase in commercialization.9 A rise in
access to higher education along with growing popularity of
television, radio, and broadcasting attracted further attention to
collegiate sports.10 This created an incentive for more universities and
colleges to create athletic programs or expand their existing
programs.11 These factors resulted in an increase in NCAA authority,
allowing the Association to create additional rules, specifically the
“Sanity Code.”12 The NCAA established the Sanity Code to “alleviate
the proliferation of exploitive practices in the recruitment of student
athletes.”13 However, after discovering that the rules were ineffective,
the NCAA repealed the Sanity Code in 1951, replacing it with the
Committee on Infractions.14
Since its formation, the NCAA gained more and more
authority, drifting further from its initial purpose.15 Now, the NCAA

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Roessler, supra note 1, at 940.
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develops and enforces rules that promote fairness and a level playing
field.16
1. Structure & Governance
The NCAA is an unincorporated, non-profit organization,
consisting of “1,117 colleges and universities, 100 athletic
conferences, and 40 sports organizations.”17 The members represent
19,750 teams and over half a million college athletes competing in
twenty-four sports across three divisions.18 The NCAA’s purpose is
“prioritizing academics well-being and fairness so college athletes can
succeed on the field, in the class, and for life.”19 The Association’s
ranks include “college presidents, athletic directors, faculty athletics
representatives, compliance officers, and conference staff.”20 Other
ranks include “academic support staff, coaches, sports information
directors, and health and safety personnel.”21 Athletic directors are
responsible for overseeing their university’s athletic staff and guiding
policy decisions, while compliance officers ensure athletes and staff
follow the NCAA-mandated rules.22
The NCAA divides member schools into three divisions based
on factors such as university size, athletic program funding, and public
appeal.23 Each division maintains certain rules and regulations that
member schools must comply with.24 Division I consists of 350
colleges and universities, most of which have large student bodies,
manage substantial athletics budgets, and offer numerous scholarship
opportunities to their students.25 Within Division I, member schools
16. Questions and Answers on Name, Image, and Likeness, NCAA (Oct. 29,
2019),
http://www.ncaa.org/questions-and-answers-name-image-and-likeness
[https://perma.cc/5RVH-XNFZ].
17. What is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/what-ncaa [https://perma.cc/48A2-ZWPH].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. About NCAA Division II, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d2
[https://perma.cc/G4PZ-463G].
24. Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/divisionaldifferences-and-history-multidivision-classification
[https://perma.cc/4CYDAAFJ].
25. NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1
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are further divided based on college football sponsorship.26 The
Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”) represents schools that compete
in top tier bowl games, making it arguably the most competitive
subdivision in Division I.27 The FBS contains well-known
conferences, such as the Big Ten, Pac-12, the Southeastern
Conference (SEC), the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), and the Big
12.28 These five conferences are made up of sixty-five programs and
are referred to collectively as the “Power Five.”29 No other sport in
this division is further subdivided in this way.30 Division II includes
310 member schools and provides scholarships or athletic aid to 60%
of student athletes in the division.31 Finally, Division III is the largest
division in the NCAA with over 400 member schools.32 In this
division, one out of six students are student athletes; however,
Division III member schools do not award athletic scholarships.33
The NCAA governance structure consists of committees
through which member representatives propose rules for college
sports regarding compliance, recruiting, academics, and
championships.34 Member schools ultimately have the power to adopt
proposed rules and implement them on their campuses.35 This
structure also allows volunteers from member schools to serve in the
legislative groups that govern each division.36 The Board of Governors
is the highest governing authority in the NCAA, comprised of
presidents and chancellors from each division.37 The Association
publishes the Board of Governors Report about four or five times each
[https://perma.cc/6CCV-EN9X].
26. Id.
27. Chris Murphy, Madness, Inc.: How Everyone is Getting Rich Off College
Sports, Except the Players 4–5 (Mar. 2019), https://www.murphy.senate.gov/downl
oad/madness-inc [https://perma.cc/B7Y3-K9BH].
28. College Football Conferences, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/collegefootball/conferences [https://perma.cc/ZTW4-JBHB].
29. Murphy, supra note 27, at 5.
30. NCAA Division I, supra note 25.
31. Our Three Divisions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions [https://perma.cc/9UNZ-WFQP].
32. About Division III, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d3
[https://perma.cc/4TRH-MSC9].
33. Our Three Divisions, supra note 31.
34. What is the NCAA?, supra note 17.
35. Id.
36. Governance,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/governance
[https://perma.cc/RT78-TRR7].
37. Id.
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year, outlining the agenda for the meeting, issues discussed, and any
decisions made during the meeting.38
The NCAA emphasizes amateurism as a major pillar of
collegiate athletics, ensuring all college athletes compete on a level
playing field.39 The underlining idea of this principle is that student
athletes and their participation in collegiate athletics should be
motivated first and foremost by education.40 Therefore, the
Association emphasizes the importance of “maintaining a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.”41 The
NCAA does not define amateur or amateurism in their bylaws or
manuals, instead it defines what an amateur athlete is by describing
what it is not.42 However, the NCAA Division I Manual (the
“Manual”) does define student athlete.43 The Manual states that a
student athlete is a student who enrolled in a university in response to
solicitation from a member of the university’s athletics staff to
ultimately compete in a collegiate athletics program.44 The Manual
defines professional athlete as an individual “who receives any kind
of payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics participation except as
permitted by the governing legislation of the Association.”45 The
Manual goes on to define pay as “the receipt of funds, awards, or
benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the Association
for participation in athletics.”46 The rules outline the Amateurism
Certification Process that student athletes and institutions must
complete for athletes to secure eligibility for practice or competition.47
The Manual also lists the various ways in which an individual can lose
38. Id.
39. Stacey Osburn, Board of Governors starts process to enhance name, image,
and likeness opportunities, NCAA (Oct. 29, 2019, 1:08 PM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-startsprocess-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities [https://perma.cc/M85FGGH7].
40. NCAA, 2019-20 NCAA Division I Manual, 3 (Aug. 2019),
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/getReport/90008
[https://perma.cc/UUX99V73].
41. Sheetz, supra note 1, at 871 (quoting 2013-14 NCAA Division I Manual 1, 1
(2013)
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5XP-A6AY]).
42. NCAA, 2019-20 NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 62.
47. Id. at 63.
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his or her amateur status, including “using his or her athletic skill for
pay; entering into an agreement with an agent; or accepting a promise
of pay.”48
2. Association & Member Schools’ Profitability
The commercialization of college sports provides the NCAA
and its member schools with large profits primarily generated from
ticket sales, merchandise, television contracts, and other various
revenue streams.49 In 2018, the NCAA reported over $1 billion in total
revenue.50 Proceeds from television and marketing rights alone
account for over $800 million of the total reported revenue.51
Similarly, the Association reported about $57 million in revenue from
sales, services, and other similar activities.52 The NCAA suggests that
it provides over $10 million in scholarships to students and member
schools annually.53 However, the NCAA only awards these
scholarships to student athletes to pursue a graduate degree or to
“complete their undergraduate degree after they have exhausted their
eligibility for other athletics-related financial aid.”54
According to the Department of Education, college athletics
programs generated $14 billion in total revenue in 2018.55 Division I
and Division II member schools award over $2.9 billion in athletics
scholarships annually to about 150,000 student athletes.56 In 2011, the
NCAA enacted legislation allowing member schools to award multiyear scholarships.57 While this was a step in the right direction to
48. Id.
49. Murphy, supra note 27, at 2–3.
50. DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
AND SUBSIDIARIES: CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE
YEARS ENDED AUGUST 31, 2018 AND 2017, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR
THE YEAR ENDED AUGUST 31, 2018, AND INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 4
(2018).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. NCAA Scholarships & Grants, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources
/ncaa-scholarships-and-grants [https://perma.cc/7DKJ-BK98].
54. Id.
55. Equity in Athletics Data Analysis, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
https://ope.ed.gov/athletics/Trend/public/#/subjects
[https://perma.cc/WMU6SLPM].
56. Scholarships,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/studentathletes/future/scholarships [https://perma.cc/JJY6-RACV].
57. Bright, supra note 1, at 179.
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protect student athletes, the legislation received backlash from athletic
directors and universities who argued that the legislation would hinder
the process of recruiting new players.58 Although the legislation
ultimately created stability for student athletes, the opposition shown
by member schools indicates their desire to control the financial power
over their student athletes.59
NCAA member schools, specifically Division I schools,
generate a substantial amount of money from endorsement deals.60 In
2018, college programs executed the largest endorsement deals with
Nike, Adidas, and Under Armour.61 The University of California, Los
Angeles conducted an endorsement deal with Under Armour valued
at an annual average of $12.76 million, making it the most valuable
deal that year.62 Other top programs such as the University of
Louisville and the University of Washington executed deals with
Adidas for an average annual value of $10.96 million and $7.89
million respectively.63 Nike continued to dominate college athletics
branding by establishing a deal with the University of Texas valued at
an annual average of $9.76 million.64 These examples highlight the
market demand for collegiate endorsements that may be available to
high performing student athletes during their collegiate career.65
B. Sherman Antitrust Act
It is important to understand how the Sherman Antitrust Act
(“Sherman Act”) relates to the NCAA, specifically how courts have
58. See id. at 180.
59. Id. at 181.
60. See Daniel Kleiman, The Most Valuable College Endorsement Deals 2018,
FORBES
(Sept.
11,
2018,
9:54
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielkleinman/2018/09/11/the-most-valuablecollege-apparel-deals-2018/#6c32f1df4be9 [https://perma.cc/D8WX-U2C6].
61. Id.
62. Daniel Kleiman, The Most Valuable College Apparel Deals: UCLA Leads
As Gear Companies’ New Mindset Thwarts Rivals, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2019, 8:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielkleinman/2019/09/13/ucla-mostvaluable-college-apparel-deals/#2645d8146762 [https://perma.cc/ND3X-GSBL].
63. Id.
64. Daniel Kleiman, The Most Valuable College Endorsement Deals 2018,
FORBES
(Sept.
11,
2018,
9:54
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielkleinman/2018/09/11/the-most-valuablecollege-apparel-deals-2018/#6c32f1df4be9
[https://perma.cc/D8WX-U2C6];
Kleiman, supra note 62.
65. Id.
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interpreted whether the Association’s regulations are subject to the
Sherman Act’s protection. The Sherman Act prohibits the restraint of
any trade or commerce that has a commercial or business objective.66
When bringing a claim under the Sherman Act, “plaintiffs
must show (1) that there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy;
(2) the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under either per se
rule of illegality or rule of reason analysis; and (3) that the restraint
affected interstate commerce.”67 The conduct at issue must have
restrained trade, commerce, or commercial competition.68 When
analyzing a Sherman Act claim, courts established the rule of reason
analysis and evaluated reasonableness by weighing the
anticompetitive effect against the procompetitive justifications.69 To
apply the rule of reason test, the plaintiff must show that a cognizable
market exists.70 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the
challenged conduct has a significant adverse impact on competition as
a whole.71 If the plaintiff meets their initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the defendant who must provide evidence that the conduct has
sufficient procompetitive “redeeming virtues.”72 Then, if the
defendant provides sufficient procompetitive effects, the plaintiff must
show that any procompetitive effects argued by the defendant could
be achieved with less restrictive means.73
It is also important to evaluate how the Sherman Act interacts
with the NCAA and the Association’s amateurism rules. Courts
typically grant the sports industry vast deference when deciding cases
involving antitrust claims.74 Some critics refer to this as special
treatment.75 The NCAA amateurism defense originated in the
Supreme Court case NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma.76 In this case, members of the NCAA argued that the
66. Greene, supra note 1, at 83.
67. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
68. Holthaus, supra note 1, at 377.
69. Id. at 378.
70. Id. at 377–78.
71. Id. at 378.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Gabe Feldman, A Modest Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP.
L. REV. 249, 249 (2014).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Association’s plan to televise college football games violated antitrust
laws.77 The plan limited “the total amount of televised intercollegiate
football” games and “the number of games that any one team may
televise.”78 It also prohibited any member of the NCAA from selling
television rights except as permitted by the plan.79 In determining the
reasonableness of the restraint, the Court decided that the promotion
of amateurism and academic ideals are sufficient procompetitive
virtues under the rule of reason analysis and are consistent with the
goals of the Sherman Act.80 The Court also described amateurism as
an economic justification, arguing that amateurism rules are essential
to the unique product of college football.81 This analysis asks courts
to balance the “anticompetitive economic effects of restrictions on
student athletes with the social benefits of amateurism to college
sports.”82 Critics argue that the promotion of amateurism is a social
goal and therefore should have no impact on the legal analysis of the
restraint.83 Although Board of Regents did not involve the regulation
of student athlete compensation, Justice Stevens emphasized
compensation caps to explain why competing institutions must
cooperate to continue marketing NCAA sports products.84 Justice
Stevens agreed with the NCAA’s argument that the amateurism rules
protect collegiate sports from becoming minor league or professional
athletics.85
Board of Regents was not the first antitrust claim against the
NCAA and will not be the last. The overall basis for bringing an
antitrust claim against the Association is that the member schools
under the NCAA conspire to keep student athletes’ compensation
fixed at tuition and educational fees, essentially forming a covenant
not to compete.86 However, courts in the most notable antitrust cases
77. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
78. Id. at 94.
79. Id.
80. Feldman, supra note 74, at 252.
81. Id. at 252–53.
82. Id. at 257.
83. Id.
84. Thomas Baker, Why the Latest NCAA Lawsuit is Unlikely to Change its
Amateurism Rules – But it Should, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2018, 12:40 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbaker/2018/09/11/the-economics-ofamateurism-breaking-down-the-latest-lawsuit-against-the-ncaa/#498b23e62478
[https://perma.cc/2LRD-94QK].
85. Id.
86. Kenneth L. Shropshire, The Erosion of the NCAA Amateurism Model, 14
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have continually agreed that “the rules governing intercollegiate
athletics are not always subject to strict antitrust analysis.”87
C. Case Law
The NCAA is no stranger to court battles regarding the validity
and enforceability of its amateurism rules and overall conduct.88
Historically, the majority of litigation focused on allegations that the
NCAA rules violate antitrust laws.89 Over time, current and former
student athletes fought for their right to compensation, making
progress through the following noteworthy cases.90
1. Gaines v. NCAA
To establish a Section 2 violation of the Sherman Act, the court
must determine that there was an unlawful exercise of monopoly
power by an organization. Under Section 2, an unlawful monopoly
consists of “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from the growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”91 The federal
antitrust laws are in place to prevent restraints on “free competition in
business and commercial transactions.”92 In Gaines v. NCAA, the
ultimate question was whether the NCAA amateurism and eligibility
rules were “unreasonably exclusive” or “anticompetitive.”93 Gaines
argued that the NCAA rules were exclusive because they discouraged
talented college football players from pursuing a career in the NFL
and created a system of maintaining control over the sport’s top
athletes.94 The court determined that the NCAA eligibility rules were
not in place to provide the Association with a commercial advantage,
rather they were meant to protect the unique product of college
football from commercial influences.95 Therefore, the court held that
SPG ANTITRUST 46, 49 (2000).
87. Greene, supra note 1, at 83.
88. Baker, supra note 84.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 742 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
92. Id. at 743.
93. Id. at 745.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 744.
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the NCAA amateurism and eligibility rules were not subject to
scrutiny under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.96
2. Banks v. NCAA
In 1992, the NCAA faced another challenge to its rules under
a slightly different theory.97 Braxton Banks, a college football player,
filed suit against the NCAA alleging that the Association’s “no-draft”
and “no-agent” rules violated antitrust laws under the Sherman Act.98
Banks argued that the NCAA rules restricted trade in two specific
ways.99 First, he argued the NCAA restrains trade by prohibiting
member universities from allowing athletes to rejoin college athletics
once that athlete has elected to be considered in the draft or hired an
agent to pursue professional sports.100 Second, Banks broadly argued
that the NCAA placed a restraint on trade by requiring member
institutions to follow the Association’s strict rules and declining to
grant waivers of those rules.101 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit noted
the previously held requirement that in order to make a claim for a
violation of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must allege anticompetitive
effects on a market.102 Because Banks did not allege that the NCAA
rules had an anticompetitive impact on an identifiable market, the
court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a
claim.103
3. O’Bannon v. NCAA
The NCAA rules serve a procompetitive purpose by promoting
an understanding of amateurism, thereby preserving consumer
demand for college sports.104 In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association, a group of current and former college football
and men’s basketball players alleged that the NCAA compensation
rules violated the Sherman Act by restricting trade relating to the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
2015).

Id. at 745.
Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083–84 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1088.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1087.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir.
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athletes’ NIL.105 After an appeal from the district court ruling in favor
of the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit contemplated whether the NCAA
rules were subject to antitrust laws and if so, whether they were an
unlawful restraint on trade.106 The Ninth Circuit held that although the
NCAA rules were likely procompetitive, they were still subject to
antitrust laws and should be analyzed under the rule of reason.107
Under the rule of reason, the court identified two relevant markets
affected by the NCAA rules: the college education market and the
group licensing market.108 The court concluded that the NCAA rules
had an anticompetitive effect on the college education market,
reasoning that without the rules, colleges would compete with each
other by offering compensation beyond the institution’s cost of
attendance.109 Although the Ninth Circuit agreed that banning
compensation for NIL violated antitrust laws, the court struck down
Judge Wilken’s suggestion at the district level that student athletes
benefit from this use of their NIL in the form of $5,000 annually.110
The court reasoned that the NCAA had the power to control payments
that are non-educational or that are not “tethered to education.”111
Ultimately, the court rejected the district court’s decision and allowed
the NCAA to maintain their amateurism rules, finding that the rules
were likely procompetitive.112
In these cases, the courts established that the Association’s
rules protected the unique nature of college sports and were not
“unreasonably exclusive” or “anticompetitive.”113 Similarly, plaintiffs
must allege anticompetitive effects on an identifiable market in order
to bring a valid claim against the NCAA.114 Although the
Association’s rules are subject to antitrust laws, courts have also found
that the Association’s rules are likely procompetitive and that the
105.
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NCAA has the power to control payments that are not related to
education.115 Based on this analysis, courts have historically provided
the NCAA with favorable treatment regarding challenges to its
amateurism and eligibility rules.116
III. FAIR PAY TO PLAY ACT
In September 2019, Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate
Bill No. 206, which will allow California students competing in
collegiate athletics to obtain compensation and representation.117 The
Bill, originally proposed by Senator Nancy Skinner, will take effect in
January 2023 and will be added to the California Education Code.118
The provisions in this legislation, called the Fair Pay to Play Act (“the
Act”), challenge historic rules prohibiting student athletes from
receiving compensation for their NIL.119
First, the Act directly discusses the issue of compensation,
addressing the rights of student athletes, athletic organizations and
associations, and postsecondary educational institutions.120 The first
provision expressly prohibits any postsecondary education institution
from enforcing a rule that prevents a student competing in
intercollegiate athletics from receiving compensation for their NIL.121
Within the first provision, the Act states that a student athlete’s receipt
of compensation shall not affect their scholarship eligibility.122 The
Act goes on to state that any group or organization with authority over
intercollegiate athletics, including the NCAA, “shall not prevent a
student participating in intercollegiate athletics from receiving
compensation for their NIL.”123 The provision also addresses
postsecondary educational institutions, stating that any group or
organization with authority over intercollegiate athletics shall not
115. Tracy, supra note 110.
116. See generally Gaines, 746 F. Supp. 738; Banks, 977 F.2d 1081; O’Bannon,
802 F.3d 1049.
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prevent a postsecondary educational institution from competing in
intercollegiate athletics due to the compensation of one of its student
athletes.124 The Act defines postsecondary educational institution as
“any campus of the University of California or the California State
University, an independent institution of higher education, or a private
postsecondary educational institution.”125 The Act applies to
individuals competing in intercollegiate athletics, but it maintains the
current rule prohibiting prospective student athletes from receiving
compensation.126
The next group of provisions addresses a student athlete’s
ability to obtain professional representation while competing in
intercollegiate athletics.127 The Act permits student athletes to obtain
professional representation regarding legal matters and contracts,
representation by agents, and legal representation by an attorney.128
Professional representation must be licensed in California and comply
with relevant sections of the Business and Professional Code
regarding agent and legal representation.129
The Act specifies how potential student athlete contracts
should cooperate with their respective team contract.130 The student
athlete’s contract to receive compensation for their NIL should not
conflict with the athlete’s team contract, and the student athlete must
disclose the nature of the contract with an official at the athlete’s
education institution.131 Team contracts that are modified, renewed, or
entered into after the enactment of the legislation must not prevent a
student athlete from using their NIL for a commercial purpose while
the student athlete is not engaged in official team events.132
One provision specifically addresses the receipt of
compensation in relation to a student athlete’s scholarship.133 The
provision states that a student athlete’s scholarship is not considered
compensation for the purposes of the Act, and a scholarship must not
124.
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be revoked due to a student athlete’s receipt of compensation or use of
professional representation.134
IV. NCAA MODERNIZATION
After California passed the new legislation, the NCAA faced
pressure to announce its position.135 The NCAA agreed that changes
need to be made but that changes should occur on a national level
through the Association’s governance structure.136 California is not
alone in this movement.137 According to the NCAA Division I Update
on the NIL topic, “thirty-one additional states have introduced or are
expected to introduce [NIL] related legislation.”138 Florida announced
its support for the legislation, and New York revealed a similar, yet
more progressive, bill called the New York Collegiate Athletic
Participation Compensation Act.139 The Association argued that
different legislation at the state level would create an unfair playing
field for universities and student athletes.140 The NCAA announced
that each division will modernize their rules in response to the state
and federal legislative environment.141
A. Board of Governors Report
On October 29, 2019, the NCAA revealed that the Board of
Governors (“the Board”) will start the process “to enhance name,
image, and likeness opportunities” for collegiate athletes.142 Michael
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Drake, chair of the Board, said that the NCAA must embrace change
and continue to take affirmative steps for additional flexibility as the
Association has done in recent years.143 The Board announced this
decision after reviewing recommendations provided by the NCAA
Federal and State Legislation Working Group (“the Group”).144 The
Group consisted of presidents, commissioners, athletic directors,
administrators, and student athletes.145 The Group spent several
months gathering feedback from current and former student athletes,
coaches, faculty, and commissioners to provide the Board with an
informed and thorough report (“the Report”).146 Acknowledging that
suggestions from each NCAA division are necessary before finalizing
any changes, the Group made the following recommendations:
 Assure student-athletes are treated similarly to non-athlete
students unless a compelling reason exists to differentiate.
 Maintain the priorities of education and the collegiate
experience to provide opportunities for student-athlete
success.
 Ensure rules are transparent, focused and enforceable and
facilitate fair and balanced competition.
 Make clear the distinction between collegiate and professional
opportunities.
 Make clear that compensation for athletics performance or
participation is impermissible.
 Reaffirm that student-athletes are students first and not
employees of the university.
 Enhance principles of diversity, inclusion and gender equity.
 Protect the recruiting environment and prohibit inducements to
select, remain at, or transfer to a specific institution.147
The Report emphasized that the use of an athlete’s NIL should in no
way be considered a substitute currency in a pay for play model.148
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Another problem that the Report notes is the lack of uniformity
that individual state legislation, like the California law, will create.149
One of the most important aspects of this process is drafting rules that
each state will adopt, allowing national consistency.150 The Group will
continue to collect suggestions and evaluate options until April 2020,
while each division begins drafting potential new rules.151 The Board
instructed each division to begin the process but specified that each
division must submit their proposed rules by January 2021.152 This
deadline falls before the California legislation is set to take effect in
2023.
The Group analyzed the NIL opportunities on a continuum,
noting potential issues and examples of regulation on both ends of the
spectrum.153 On one end, the Group stated that student athletes should
receive compensation for their NIL when it is in the interest of
promoting their work product or business, especially when unrelated
to athletics.154 In the event that the work product or business is related
to athletics, the Group suggested that the NCAA implement certain
regulations to monitor any potential abuse.155 The Group listed
examples of potential regulations including prior approval by athletic
directors or university representatives and prohibiting school
involvement in the development or promotion of related
opportunities.156 On the other end of the spectrum, the Group
addressed one of the more obvious concerns: allowing student athletes
to receive compensation for their NIL would be the equivalent of
allowing student athletes to receive compensation for participating in
athletic events.157 The Group noted again that this form of
compensation is potentially pay for play, which is inconsistent with
the collegiate model.158 The Report suggested that the NCAA prohibit
agreements that require or encourage enrollment in a particular school
or group of schools.159 Another potential regulation involves
149.
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restricting college athletes or third parties from using any institutional,
conference, or NCAA brand marks in the activity.160
B. Division Regulations
The NCAA instructed each division to evaluate their current
rules and draft new or amended rules.161 The Report outlines two areas
where the NCAA needs to address NIL compensation: (1)
compensation for NIL when promoting work product or business and
(2) compensation derived from a student athlete’s association with
their university or participation in NCAA athletics.162
In a short statement regarding new action by the NCAA, the
Board already provided more information on how to realistically
address the compensation issue than any proposed legislation. The text
of the Act itself lacks any indication of how California institutions will
regulate student athlete compensation or even who holds that
responsibility.163 The Report mentions consistency as one of the most
important aspects of responding to the legislative environment.164 As
this Comment points out, California is not the only state to announce
new legislation. If every state enacted similar legislation but included
different requirements, such as the New York bill requiring
distribution of 15% of revenue to student athletes, it would be nearly
impossible to regulate collegiate sports. Therefore, consistency is the
basis for drafting new regulations for all NCAA member schools to
implement.
The Report differentiates the first type of compensation by
work product or business unrelated to athletics and work product or
business that is related to athletics.165 The most difficult issue will be
determining where value driven by the work product ends and value
driven by the student athlete’s NIL begins.166 The Report suggested
that the NCAA may address these concerns by requiring prior
approval from an athletic director or representative.167 In order for this
regulation to work, each university would need to create an athletic
160.
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director position to keep track of which student athletes this regulation
applies to and monitor whether the student is seeking approval or not;
this would require significant time and commitment from the athletic
director. It would also be beneficial to implement penalties for
noncompliance, another aspect requiring time and commitment by
representatives.168
Division III delegates provided updates and received input at
the 2020 NCAA Convention.169 The Division III Issues Forum
highlighted the NIL topic, discussing potential areas of change.170
Delegates at the forum led the conversation on innovative
compensation models that allow compensation for the use of NIL,
noting that any new legislation related to NIL issues would not be
presented until the 2021 Convention.171 Division III rules currently
include specific exceptions that allow the use of NIL, such as
“institutional, charitable, educational and nonprofit; modeling and
other non-athletically related promotional activity; media activities;
and student athlete’s own business.”172 At the convention, members
stated that “fairness, equity, and opportunity” were key concepts to
consider as the modernization process continues.173
V. IMPACT AND SUGGESTIONS
As this Comment emphasizes, the NCAA is committed to
adopting a comprehensive solution that allows student athletes
participating in college athletics to benefit from the use of their NIL,
so long as that compensation complies with the NCAA collegiate
model.174 The NCAA acknowledges that as the realm of college
athletics changes, student athletes have a right to benefit from the use
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of their reputation while competing at the collegiate level.175 NCAA
President Mark Emmert addressed concerns surrounding the use of
NIL at the NCAA 2020 Convention, stressing the importance of the
Association’s role in developing rules that support student athletes.176
Emmert stated that he “regularly meets with lawmakers” and noted
that their concerns are broad and span more issues than just NIL.177
He defined the ongoing debate as one over “inherent fairness.”178
Emmert closed the presentation by saying, “[the NCAA] may need
help from Congress and others along the way, but this is our job.”179
By highlighting their role in this process, the NCAA outwardly
takes responsibility for implementing effective change. The NCAA
must adapt its bylaws and implement a new compensation model for
all member schools to follow. The Association maintains a strict
distinction between amateurs and professional athletes, and allowing
student athletes to receive compensation while in college will affect
the meaning of those words. Therefore, the NCAA must reevaluate the
definitions contained in its bylaws and amend the language to reflect
the Association’s modernization. The NCAA must also develop and
implement a new compensation model that considers the proposed
changes and the demands of student athletes.
A. Definitions that Create Consistency
The NCAA continues to voice its opinion on one major
problem with the new legislation: the possibility that student athlete
compensation will be a substitute currency in a pay for play model.180
Following the recommendations in the Report, the NCAA must amend
its bylaws and redefine the terms at issue as the Association develops
a new compensation model. One problem with the California
legislation is the name itself. The Act is referred to as the Fair Pay to
Play Act, insinuating that student athletes will be paid simply for their
participation athletic programs. In reality, the Act allows for student
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athletes to receive compensation not for their participation in athletics
but for the use of their NIL, mannerisms, and overall identity. Even
more controversial, the New York bill would require each NCAA
member school in New York to set aside 15% of their revenue from
athletic ticket sales to divide among student athletes.181 The goal of
the Group and the NCAA is to create new rules that anticipate and
allow for future compensation of college athletes while preserving
amateurism in the collegiate model.182
The NCAA does not define amateur athlete, but it does define
professional athlete. Essentially, the NCAA defines professional
athlete as an individual who receives payment for their participation
in an athletic event; therefore, the NCAA should redefine pay and
compensation to ensure that student athletes do not receive payment
for their participation even if they receive compensation while
competing in college athletics. The rules should differentiate between
professional athletes who receive a salary for their participation in
sporting events and collegiate athletes who receive compensation for
their NIL—essentially their public appeal. This would ensure clarity
when drafting and enforcing new regulations and would protect the
Association’s notion of amateurism.
B. Fair & Enforceable Compensation Model
The NCAA should create a compensation model that allows
student athletes to receive compensation for their NIL, while honoring
its fundamental beliefs in amateurism and commitment to education.
To achieve these goals, the most effective model is a trust fund model
that distributes money on a predetermined schedule. However, the
trust fund model is not new. While the models suggested in the past
are beneficial to student athletes and provide a solution to the
compensation issue, they are vulnerable to attacks based on
employment status, personal regulation, and education. The best
model to adopt is a distributed trust fund compensation model with
modifications that account for the NCAA’s focus on amateurism and
education; the concern that student athletes will be viewed as
181. Jabari Young, Florida and NY Push Bills to Compete with California’s
NCAA ‘pay to play’ Law, CNBC (Oct. 24, 2019 2:29 PM),
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employees; and student athletes’ best interests. The proposed
framework has three components: the right to receive payments,
scheduled distribution, and regulation and oversight.
1. Right to Receive Payments
First, the proposed model clearly indicates that student athletes
will have the right to receive compensation for their NIL and that their
compensation will be placed in a trust fund. The NCAA should adopt
a trust fund model similar to those suggested in the past but should not
allow student athletes to receive any part of institution’s revenue from
merchandise incorporating the student athlete’s NIL. Instead, this
model should focus on the student athlete’s ability to engage in
endorsement deals related to their NIL. The model should not make
any comparisons to student athletes as employees or indicate that
compensation is for their athletic ability. Essentially, all endorsement
deals should originate from third parties, removing the possibility that
universities compensate the student athlete directly.
Various arguments focus on a multiyear scholarship or trust
fund structure for compensation. For example, one model suggests a
percentage-based trust fund in which the student athlete receives a
percentage of the NCAA’s revenue from merchandise containing the
student athlete’s NIL.183 In this model, the terms of the trust fund,
specifically the percentage of revenue, are negotiated during the
recruiting process.184 Even though this model allows student athletes
to receive compensation, it potentially infringes too far into the realm
of professional sports. Negotiating terms and percentages during the
recruitment process undermines the meaning of amateurism and leads
to inequality among member schools and student athletes.
Two other trust fund based models have been suggested over
the years.185 In O’Bannon, the plaintiffs suggested a trust fund model
in which compensation would be placed in a trust fund until the
student athlete graduated or left the school.186 The International
Olympic Committee (“IOC”) adopted a similar structure; however, it
allowed student athletes to access the funds both during and after their
183.
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time competing.187 The IOC model suggests that student athletes are
entitled to withdraw funds during their competition season only to pay
for necessary expenses.188 However, after the conclusion of the
competitive season each year, student athletes have the right to access
any remaining funds at their discretion.189 Both of these models
incorporate a percentage of revenue from the sale of merchandise
containing the athlete’s NIL.190 Although these arguments provide
examples of possible solutions, they either contain specific flaws,
making them difficult to implement, or they came at a time when the
NCAA felt less pressure to initiate change. However, the NCAA is
now at a point where a trust fund model may be the most effective
option to satisfy the demands of student athletes.
The model proposed in this Comment allows student athletes
to receive compensation for their NIL based on endorsement deals
they make during their collegiate career, rather than receiving
distributions from the NCAA or their university’s revenue. The money
received from endorsement deals should be placed in a trust fund and
distributed based on a schedule, which is detailed in the second
component of this structure.
2. Scheduled Distribution
The second component of this structure is the distribution
method. The terms of the contract should outline a percentage of the
compensation that the student athlete may receive while competing in
college athletics. This structure differs from the trust fund models
described above because the percentage the athlete receives will not
come from the university’s revenue. The student athlete will receive
the percentage of their compensation at the end of each academic year.
The student athlete will receive the remainder of the compensation
upon graduation from the university they attend. If the student athlete
elects to pursue professional athletics before obtaining their degree,
essentially initiating a breach of contract, the student athlete forfeits a
predetermined percentage of their compensation to the NCAA and
their member school. This provides an incentive for student athletes to
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

312

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 7

continue their education and compensates the NCAA and member
institution for any loss of expected benefits. Withholding part of the
student athlete’s compensation until graduation also emphasizes the
NCAA’s focus on education.
In comparison to the O’Bannon model, the model proposed in
this Comment gives student athletes the right to receive a fraction of
their compensation at the end of each academic year. However, it is
similar to the O’Bannon model by withholding the remainder of
compensation until the student graduates or leaves the institution. Like
the IOC model, the model proposed here allows student athletes to
receive part of their compensation during their time at the university.
However, unlike the IOC model, student athletes do not have the
ability to access the funds at any time. Also, this model does not
suggest that the NCAA or member schools have the ability to regulate
the ways in which the student athlete uses the distributed funds.
3. Regulation & Oversight
The third component of the proposed model requires that a
representative from the NCAA and the member university oversee the
execution of the contract. When executing endorsement deals, student
athletes must comply with uniform terms generated by the NCAA and
member schools. If an athlete fails to comply with the defined terms
in any way, the athlete loses their eligibility to compete in NCAA
events. Uniform terms will ensure consistency in the ways that student
athletes receive compensation and avoid issues affecting the eligibility
of the athlete or member school. The NCAA should also consider
including terms that limit the length of contracts. For example, student
athletes may not execute compensation contracts that extend longer
than five years; however, they may renegotiate contracts to align with
the student athlete’s eligibility schedule.
The trust fund model proposed in this Comment addresses
certain issues that other suggested models ignore, increasing the
probability of its success if adopted by the NCAA. The revenue
sharing aspect of various models creates a problem regarding the
status of the student athlete during their time at the institution. If the
athlete receives a percentage of the university’s revenue, the athlete
begins to look more like an employee of the university, rather than a
student. To avoid the possibility that student athletes become
employees, the NCAA should adopt a compensation model that
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ignores revenue sharing. Also, the proposed model does not allow the
NCAA to regulate the student athlete’s use of compensation funds,
giving student athletes complete control over their compensation.
The NCAA should also consider how modernization will
affect individuals that member schools intend to recruit. The right to
receive compensation as a student athlete will not only affect college
athletes but also high school athletes. To address this issue, the NCAA
should restrict the type of student athlete eligible to receive
compensation. The NCAA could implement this restriction in two
ways. First, the Association could amend their eligibility rules. If
athletes receive compensation or execute a contract to receive
compensation before competing at the collegiate level, they will be
ineligible to compete in NCAA athletic events. This method would
reduce the possibility of paying student athletes to compete. The
second way that the NCAA could create this type of restriction is to
include a term in compensation contracts that requires proof of
enrollment at a member school. Although the NCAA’s current bylaws
may address this issue in some way, it is important that the NCAA
create as much consistency as possible moving forward to ensure
fairness and equity across the different sports and divisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Act from California and similar legislation finally forced
the NCAA to make significant changes regarding student athletes’
right to compensation. As the NCAA continues to modernize its rules,
the Association must act in the best interest of student athletes and
consider the purpose of the proposed legislation. Although the rules
may be marginally different across NCAA divisions, the critical factor
of modernization is adapting and enforcing the regulations in a
uniform manner. The trust fund structure proposed in this Comment
maintains the concept of amateurism by avoiding any inclination that
the student athlete receive payment solely for their participation or
commitment to participate at a particular university. Student athletes
will have the right to receive compensation for the use of their NIL by
engaging in endorsement deals during their time competing in college
athletics. The proposed model considers the call to action by student
athletes, highlights their right to receive compensation for their NIL,
and maintains the NCAA’s amateurism standards.

